Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are expected to succeed in transforming migrants' remittances into deposits. Based on an original database including 114 MFIs from Africa, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and East Asia and the Pacific, this paper empirically examines the occurrence of this expected success. It tests whether MFIs operating on the remittances market capture more deposits than others. The results exhibit a positive and significant effect of the money transfer activity on the amounts of deposits in MFIs. 
I.

Introduction
Officially recorded remittances to developing countries amounted to 325 billion USD in 2010 (World Bank, 2011) . They constitute the second largest source of external finance for those countries, after foreign direct investment. Given the increasing importance of remittances in total international capital flows, there is a growing literature on the relationship between remittances and development (see for instance Azam and Gubert, 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Faini, 2007) . Recent studies have highlighted the role of financial intermediaries as determinants of remittances' impact on long-term growth of the receiving countries (Mundaca, 2009; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009 ). Despite the majority of migrants and remittances receivers in developing countries are unbanked and (potential) clients of MFIs, the relationship between remittances, microfinance and growth has not been adequately studied. This paper analyses the role of microfinance institutions (MFIs) as financial intermediaries between remittances receivers and the formal economy. Through an empirical analysis, it tests whether MFIs are able to turn remittances into deposits that can be used to fund investment projects and thus contribute to growth. This paper attempts to fill the gap in the existing literature of financial development as a determinant of the macroeconomic impact of remittances, contributing to the debate of the role of microfinance by analyzing the ability of MFIs to turn remittances inflows into deposits. Actually, through a panel regression we look at the impact of money transfer activities on the deposits collected by these institutions.
The relationship between remittances, financial development and growth is ambiguous.
Actually, well-functioning financial markets may help direct remittances to projects that yield the highest return and thus enhance growth rates, thanks to low cost of conducting transactions. In this case, remittances impact on growth should increase with the level of financial development. Mundaca (2009) find empirical evidence for remittances and financial development as complements for growth, thanks to remittances recycled into lendable funds.
However, remittances may become a substitute for inefficient or nonexistent credit markets by helping local entrepreneurs to reduce their credit constraints, which can play a critical role in determining growth prospects in economies characterized by a high level of income inequality (Aghion et al., 1999) 2 . In this case, remittances impact on formal investment should decrease with the level of financial development. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) find evidence for that. Gheeraerts et al. (2010) find simultaneously these two opposite effects of the financial development on remittances impact on growth: when financial development increases, the cost of holding a deposit account decreases and more remittances can be recycled into the financial system and then be used for investments (complements), while at the same time, the cost of borrowing on external market decreases, which reduces the necessity for remittances to serve as lendable funds (substitutes).
It appears that the ability for remittances to fund formal investments depends on remittances receivers' access to financial institutions. Actually, through their capacity to take deposits, financial institutions raise migrants' ability to save. Furthermore, given their ability to engage in financial intermediation, they increase the likelihood that migrants' deposits are channeled into productive investments (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak, 2006) . According to Orozco (2007) , the majority of migrants are excluded from using banking services. This lack of access is due to various barriers that can be related to physical access, affordability and eligibility (Beck et al., 2008) . (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Gupta et al., 2009) , as well as on the impact of access to banking services on migrants' savings (Amuedo- Dorantes and Bansak, 2006) , to our knowledge, the hypothesis of a positive impact of remittances flows on deposits in MFIs has not been econometrically tested yet 5 .
Using an original database of 114 MFIs operating in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), South Asia (SA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), and Africa, this paper studies whether 3 An extended literature exists on microfinance. See for instance Armendariz and Morduch (2009) . 4 According to Orozco and Hamilton (2006) , on 29 MFIs studied in Latin America, 41.5% of them offered to remittances receivers their typical services and 14% had elaborated tailored packages for remittances receivers. 5 The relationship between remittances and microfinance has often been studied through case-studies. See for instance Orozco and Hamilton (2006) and Ponsot (2006 information on the supply of a money transfer service within the MFI was collected).
Our main result suggests that the money transfer activity has a significant positive impact on deposits. MFIs involved on the remittances market thus attract more deposits than the others, probably coming from migrants and remittances receivers. This positive impact may be explained by the induced lower transaction costs for remittances receivers to deposit their money in a financial institution. Results suggest that increasing the supply of money transfer activities by MFIs should contribute to improve remittances impact on growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II examines what are the potential explanatory variables for deposits. Section III outlines the methodology and data. While section IV provides empirical results. Finally, section V concludes.
II. Potential explanatory variables for deposits
Various factors can influence the amount of deposits collected by a MFI. Even if we control for other elements, such as the economy, remittances inflows within the country, and the legal status of the MFI, we particularly test the relevance of an indicator: the money transfer activity.
Money transfer activity
Migrants and remittances receivers are in need of financial services and are willing to put their savings in a financial institution as long as adapted financial products are available (Acción, 2004; Orozco and Fedewa, 2005) . Furthermore, remittances can create not only a need for financial products from receivers, but can also make these persons eligible for any other available financial product. Remittances receivers may then come in a MFI first because of the money transfer service, and then because of other adapted financial services are available to them in this MFI, for instance deposit solutions. In this case, all else equal, the money transfer activity (MTA) should contribute to increasing deposits in the MFI. By providing money transfer services, MFIs may also contribute to increase competition on the market, which should lead to reduced sending fees and allow remitters to realize economies (Orozco, 2007) . In this case, the money available for deposits should increase. 
Hypothesis
Additional controls: MFI's characteristics
We have firstly included a measure of the poverty of the clientele served by MFIs, the average size of loans (ALS), which gives an indication on individuals' ability to save.
Secondly, we have also included a measure of the remuneration of the deposits, the financial expense ratio (FER i ), measured as financial expense (or expenses on funding liabilities) / average total assets 7 . A high remuneration should motivate deposits within the institution;
however, according to related literature, the poor value the opportunity to have their money kept in a safe place more than the interest rate offered by the institution (see for instance Deshpande and Glisovic-Mezieres, 2007 and Wright, 2003) .
We have thirdly included a measure of the interest charged on loans, approximated by MFIs' financial revenue ratio (FRR i ), measured as financial revenue (or income generated by loan portfolio) / average total assets 8 . The interest charged directly affects individuals' ability to save, as it has an impact on their revenues.
Finally, we included proxies for the trust toward the institution 9 , namely a dummy for the legal status of the MFI (Bank, Cooperative, Non-profit, Non-bank financial institution, Rural banks), and the size of the institution 10 (Assets).
As our sample is constituted only by MFIs which collect voluntary savings, adding an indicator of their regulatory environment as an explanatory variable is not necessary. Indeed, regulation has an impact not on the amount of savings that can be collected by institutions, but on the opportunity to collect savings or not.
Additional controls: Macroeconomic indicators
Following Aggarwal et al., (2011) and Gupta et al., (2009) , who studied the impact of remittances on financial development (measured by the level of bank deposits expressed as a percentage of the gross domestic product or GDP), we have included in our specification a measure of remittances flows, remittances inflows to receiving country's GDP (Rem/GDP).
We have also measures of the country level of development, namely the GDP per capita in constant US dollars (GDPpc) and GDP changes in one year (∆GDP(-1)) and two years (∆GDP(-2)). Finally, we have a measure of the financial sector openness, the private capital inflows (KInflows 11 ), and a measure of the inflation, the annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (∆CPI).
We have also included a measure of financial inclusion, which was not in the specification of Aggarwal et al., (2011) . According to Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2006), access to banking services could increase amount remitted and encourage migrants to save. The indicator used is the percentage of the adult population with access to an account with a financial intermediary in the country (FinInclusion).
Remittances are computed by statistical agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN), or the World Bank, as the sum of three items in the Balance of Payments, i.e., (1) compensation of non-resident employees, (2), workers' remittances, and (3) migrant transfers. The two first items belong to the current account (through, respectively, income and current transfers), and the last item to the capital account (through capital transfers). Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Alfieri et al. (2005) , ,
Where D is the indicator of the volume of deposits collected by the MFI i at time t, and it is measured as the natural logarithm of deposits. MTA is the dummy for the occurrence of a money transfer activity in the MFI. X is a vector of macroeconomic and institutional explanatory variables. Institutional variables include: the ALS (natural logarithm of the average loan size of the MFI divided by the GDP per capita of the country), the FER (which gives an idea of deposits' remuneration), the FRR (which gives an indication on interest rates charged on loans), the size (natural logarithm of the assets) and a set of legal status dummies that show organizational differences.
Macroeconomic variables include: remittances inflows in the country of origin, divided by the GDP, the GDP per capita (the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita which capture the standard of living of the country) and the change in GDP, the inflation, the volume of financial inflows as an indicator of country's financial openness and the level of financial inclusion in the country. ε is the regression residual.
The data
MFIs voluntarily participate in the MIX Market database and have to enclose documentation that supports the data (such as annual reports and audited financial statements). Therefore, the database probably represents a random sample of best managed MFIs in the world, as they should have an adequate information structure to provide required documentation (Krauss and Walter, 2008) . We have included in our sample only the MFIs that collect deposits. Basic statistics obtain from our sample appear to be similar with the overall MIX database statistics.
For instance, in 2006, the FER of our sample is 4.7%, compared to 5% for the larger MIX database. The FRR is around 23% for our sample, compared to 24% for the MIX. However, in terms of loan size, MFIs in our sample lend on average bigger amounts compared to the overall MIX database (US$ 900 compared to US$ 725). 
IV. Estimations and results
We start the analysis by examining the multicollinearity dimension. Correlations between the continuous explanatory variables are shown in Table 3 . The table stresses that many variables are significantly correlated. However, except for the variations of the GDP, correlation coefficients remain all under 0.8, the level at which multicollinearity problems appears (Kennedy, 2008) . We have then kept only the one-year variation of the GDP in our regression. In order to assess the validity of our model, we test different empirical specifications of the equation. In Equation (1), we have a benchmark specification with includes only the significant parameters. In equations (2) and (3) we include respectively additional MFI parameters (legal status and FER) and macroeconomic variables (GDP related variables, remittances and inflation), plus an interaction term (remittances flows and MTA, to see if MTA mediate the impact of remittances).
In accordance to our expectations, MTA always positively contribute to the volume of deposits in MFIs. The coefficient related to our variable of interest is positive and significant at 5% level in all the specifications. This means that MFIs providing money transfer services have a significantly higher level of deposits that the ones who do not. Additional deposits may come from remittances flows that have transited through MFIs thanks to these services. This result confirms the hypothesis that MFIs can contribute in turning remittances into deposits, which increases remittances impact on long term growth through the funding of productive investments.
The region matters when we consider the level of deposits mobilized by MFIs. Actually, regarding regional dummies, it appears that south Asian MFIs have a significantly lower level of deposit compared to MFIs from any other region. The ALS's coefficient is always positive and strongly significant, meaning the richer the client, the higher his ability to save money. The FRR's coefficient is always significant at 1% and negative, as expected. The higher the interest paid on credits, the lesser clients will have money available for deposits.
Regarding confidence towards the institution, it appears that bigger MFIs attract more deposits that smaller institutions, as they are certainly perceived to be better managed that the later. Legal status dummies are never significant in our regressions.
Turning to macroeconomic variables, the coefficient of financial inclusion is always positive and significant. Actually, as it is measured as the percentage of adult population with access to a financial intermediary in the country, the amount of deposits collected by MFIs, as financial intermediaries, increases with this percentage. Regarding the level of financial openness, the coefficient is always positive and strongly significant. This means that private capital inflows in a country increase its habitants' capacity to save, which increase their deposits in financial institutions. Finally, the coefficient of GDP per capita, which capture the standard of living of the country, is also positive and significant, as expected.
The coefficients of the remaining variables are not significant. It is worth mentioning that the non significance of the FER's coefficient is in line with the literature arguing that the interest rate paid on deposits by financial institutions is not, for the majority of poor people, the main determinant of their decision to put the money on an account in a financial institution.
Remittances flows' coefficient also is not significant. This means that we do not find a direct impact of remittances flows within the country on the volume of deposits collected by MFIs.
Their impact on MFIs' deposits may come from the interaction between remittances flows and the provision of money transfer services by MFIs. However, the interaction term's coefficient is not significant in our regression.
To sum it all, our empirical results confirm our hypothesis: operating on the money transfer market contribute to increase the volume of deposits mobilized by MFIs, because these institutions contribute to the financial inclusion of remittances receivers who mainly lack of bank access. Results also confirm some previous results related to remittances and to deposits in microfinance, such as the importance of the trust in the MFIs and the fact that remuneration of deposits do not matter for the majority of depositors.
V.
Conclusion
By measuring the impact of money transfer activities on deposits in MFIs, this paper analyses the potential role of microfinance as a channel to improve the growth impact of remittances in developing countries. Actually, given the majority of remittances senders and receivers are excluded from traditional banks in developing countries, MFIs may be the only formal financial intermediaries able to recycle remittances flows into the economy, improving their growth impact.
The results suggest a positive and significant effect of MTA on the level of deposits mobilized by the MFIs of our sample, which goes in the scheme of a role for microfinance when thinking about improving remittances' growth impact. However, this result should be taken carefully, given the limited size of the database both in terms of year and number of observation. Furthermore, it could have been interesting to instrument our variable of interest (MTA), in order to assess the occurrence of a causality problem between the volume of deposit and the supply of a money transfer service. However, we were not able to find an instrument for MTA. Nevertheless, the main implication of our result is the promotion of the supply of money transfer by MFIs in developing countries.
From the microfinance industry perspective, more than the technical aspects to be considered by MFIs that are willing to enter the remittances market, other issues need to be carefully assessed. One of the main potential consequences of MTA of MFIs is the additional available financial resources through migrants and remittances receivers' deposits. However, these deposits may have specific characteristics, especially in terms of volatility, as depositors' behavior may differ from 'traditional' depositors' behavior (higher average amount deposited and longer term deposits for instance, which may lead to a highest sensitivity to interest rates on deposits). Using migrants' money as a source of funding may then imply that MFIs acquire additional management capacity, to be able to overcome this induced higher liquidity risk.
Managers should be able to determine whether migrants' money only increase their liquidities or short term funds or are longer term resources.
Another issue to be considered is that the MTA may penalize microfinance clients who are not remittances receivers. Actually, literature suggests that remittances can be used as collateral for loans. Descriptive statistics point the fact that remittances receivers are economically better-off as compared to non-remittances receivers (highest ALS, even if the difference is not statistically significant). There may be a danger that, with too much emphasis on remittances as a source of funding for MFIs, clients that do not receive remittances may be weeded out of MFIs' portfolios.
Finally, the impact of microfinance on remitting costs needs to be evidenced, as it can be ambiguous. Actually, MFIs are expected to contribute to increase competition on the money transfer market, which should lead to lower sending charges for remitters. Furthermore, MFIs social objectives may also prevent them from charging high commissions compared to other operators of money transfers. All else equal, lower sending charges will increase the amount of money available for deposits.
However, offering competitively low commission rates on money transfers may be harder for MFIs than for the other formal and informal institutions that currently operate in the money transfer market, because MFIs face higher transaction costs in their activities (lending, savings collection) than other financial operators, due to less available information on clients and activities in remote areas for instance. Furthermore, remitters' transaction and financial costs will depend on the business model implemented by MFIs in order to enter the remittances market, and on their negotiation power. In the case of operating as sub-agents of money transfer operators (MTOs) 15 , transaction costs for the remitter will depend on MTO's network in the country of migration. Regarding financial costs, MFIs are not really in a position to do anything about the level of commission charges paid by remitters. Not only do MTOs offer their services at a higher cost compared to the other actors on the market, but furthermore, in this business model there are also a high number of intermediaries. The more intermediaries there are between the remitter and the recipient of the remittance, the higher the level of commission charges.
In the cases when MFIs are owners of a remittances product, remitting costs will be -at least in principle-lower, since there are less intermediaries involved in the transaction and also due to the fact that, given the social concerns of the MFIs, they are less likely to apply commission charges designed to generate an excess level of profit. The impact of MFIs on remitting costs has not been empirically studied yet. 15 The formal money transfers market is dominated by MTOs, with Western Union being the main one. 
